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South Africa appears to share some of the characteristics (property price boom, easing of 
monetary policy, strong domestic demand growth) of asset price booms in industrial 
countries that were often followed by a period of weak growth. The international experience 
suggests that a number of practical obstacles need to be overcome before a more proactive 
role of monetary policy is warranted. However, a larger variety of available mortgage 
contracts, including longer-term fixed-rate contracts, should allow for a more efficient 
allocation of interest rate risks. Also, a more systematic nationwide collection of property 
price data, including data on commercial property price developments, would provide a more 
representative basis for analysis.  
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International Lessons for the Property Price Boom in South Africa
 
  




Asset prices in South Africa have risen strongly over the past few years. Since 1999 
residential property prices have increased by well over 100 percent in real terms. Stock prices 
have also grown by 50 percent in real terms since 2003 (Figure 1).    
Asset price booms do not last forever. Empirical evidence for a group of industrial countries 
suggests that sharp corrections in equity prices occurred on average every 13 years and lasted 
for about 2½ years. Sharp house price corrections have been less frequent, roughly one bust 
every 20 years, but the average correction lasted longer and output losses were larger (IMF, 
2003).
 2    
This raises a number of policy questions for South Africa.  How does South Africa’s boom 
compare with past booms in industrial countries? What distinguishes a boom that results in a 
slowdown of economic activity from a boom that does not? What can and should 
policymakers do to minimize the risk that a boom period ends in a bust? This paper addresses 
these questions by drawing on the experience of industrial countries. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section I reviews briefly the economic link between asset 
price developments and economic activity. Section II discusses the identification of asset 
price booms. Section III looks at indicators that may allow to distinguish between asset price 
booms that were followed by recessions and those that did not result in a severe slowdown.  
Section IV is devoted to practical policy issues. Section V offers some tentative policy 
conclusions.  
I.   TRANSMISSION MECHANISMS 
Asset price fluctuations may affect the real economy through a variety of channels. These 
include their effect on consumption via a wealth change, investment, and banks’ balance-
sheets (Mishkin, 2001). 
Changes in asset prices affect household consumption spending through a wealth effect, 
primarily in the form of stock market and real estate valuations. Recent studies for the United 
States find that a $1 decrease in stock market wealth leads to a reduction of spending of 4–7 
                                                 
1 *Senior Economist, African Department, International Monetary Fund;  
   **Assistant Professor, Department of Economics University of Hagen;  
   ***Professor (Chair), Department of Economics, University of Hagen.  
2 To qualify as a bust real equity prices (real property prices) had to exceed 37 percent (14 percent) 
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cents; for other industrialized countries, the impact is somewhat less (e.g., IMF, 2002). The 
main effect is short-lived and dissipates over 1–3 years. Empirical analyses suggest that the 
impact of a significant fall in real estate prices may be more important than an equivalent 
decline in stock prices (Case, Quigley, and Shiller, 2001), though this finding is not 
unchallenged (Ludwig and Slok, 2002). Available evidence for a group of emerging markets 
also suggests that there is a small, but statistically significant, relationship between stock 
market developments and private consumption. Over a three-year period, a 10 percent 
decline (increase) in stock prices is associated, on average, with a 0.2–0.4 percent decrease 
(increase) in private consumption (Funke, 2004).  
Large asset price swings also affect investment and this relationship is captured by Tobin’s 
“q” (e.g., Tobin, 1980). With rising stock prices the market value of firms increases, relative 
to its replacement cost, and thus makes the financing of investment projects relatively 
cheaper. In contrast, in the case of a significant decline in stock prices, companies find it 
more difficult to raise equity and can only raise less money relative to the cost of equipment, 
thus investment may decline. Comparable mechanisms are in place in real estate markets. A 
higher price of housing, relative to construction costs stimulates housing construction 
because of higher profitability. The reverse is true for falling house prices. A sudden decline 
in property prices renders investment less attractive and reduces the profitability of the 
investment. As a result, investment may dry up and contribute to an economic slowdown. 
A weakening of asset prices may have adverse effects on financial stability. Changes in asset 
prices may be transmitted to the real side of the economy through banks’ balance sheet 
effects. An increase in stock market or real estate wealth increases the available collateral 
and strengthens the financial position of borrowers. The higher level of available collateral 
tends to reduce the agency costs of the lender, diminishes borrowers’ incentives to engage in 
moral hazard, and leads to a reduction in the external finance premium (Wagner and Berger, 
2002). Lenders’ willingness to supply credit increases and hence investment and consumer 
durable expenditure may increase. A decline in net worth, as a result for example of falling 
equity or property prices, may set into motion opposite effects.  
 
II.   IDENTIYING OF ASSET PRICE BOOM PERIODS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Any closer analysis of asset price booms requires a definition of boom periods. 
Unfortunately, there is no well established definition of what an asset price boom is; and 
booms are sometimes associated with bubbles. Though loosely speaking a bubble describes a 
significant deviation of an asset price from a well-defined fundamental value, identification 
of bubbles remains very controversial. Distinguishing asset price booms from asset price 
bubbles is a challenging task as surging asset prices may be driven by good news on 
economic developments or by a speculative bubble or a combination of both. As a 
consequence, a number of economists doubt that it is possible to identify bubbles (e.g., 
Mishkin, 2001, p. 15). “Identifying a bubble in the process of inflating may be among the  -  4  - 
 
most formidable challenges confronting a central bank” (Alan Greenspan, 1999 from The 
Economist September 26, 2002). 
 
From a theoretical perspective, a bubble refers to a situation where the price of an 
asset exceeds its fundamental value by a wide margin. However, making such assessment is 
fraught with complications. As a result, most empirical analyses follow a more pragmatic 
approach and focus on large and persistent increases in asset prices, using business cycle 
techniques (e.g. IMF, 2003) or large deviations from trend, to identify boom periods. In the 
latter case, trend measures have been derived on the basis of past growth rates or on the basis 
of filtering techniques, such as a Hodrick-Prescott filter (e.g., Bordo and Jeanne, 2002, and 
Detken and Smets, 2004).  
Using an asset price gap measure, that is the difference between the actual value and a 
trend (equilibrium) value, has the advantage that it reduces the weight given to high growth 
rates directly after a sharp market correction. Following Detken and Smets (2004), we 
associate an asset price boom with a period in which the real property price index or an 
aggregate asset price index is 10 percent above its trend based on a Hodrick-Prescott filter.
3 
Because of the higher volatility of equity prices, a 10 percent threshold produces an 
excessively large number of booms for equities, therefore we raise the threshold to 25 
percent. This method gives reasonable results for South Africa. The recent increase in 
property prices may indeed be classified as a property price boom, particularly since 2003. 
Since 1980, house price developments appear to be in their second cycle. Following the 
house price boom in the early 1980s (1981-84) with its peak in1984, house prices fell by over 
40 percent in real terms within three years. Based on the above criteria, stock price 
developments during 2004 do not yet fall in the category of a boom period. But, when equal 
weights are given to stock and house price developments, the situation could be characterized 
as an aggregate asset price boom since 2004.
4  
Some concerns over price stability in the housing market and adverse economic 
consequences derive from three sources. First, as housing affordability has declined, some 
households may become more vulnerable to economic shocks. If the value of mortgage debt 
and debt service relative to income increased, homeowners could be forced to sell (or driven 
in default), thereby increasing the supply of housing and driving prices down. Second, the 
possibility of rising interest rates as strong growth continues and inflation pressures build, 
could affect household’s debt-service capacity and dampen housing demand. Mortgage 
contracts are typically based on variable rates. Fixed mortgages are also offered, but mostly 
                                                 
3 The HP filter derives a trend such that it minimizes a weighted average of the gap between actual 
asset prices and the rate of change of asset prices. A disadvantage of the HP filter is that the end 
points of the filtered trend series tend to be sensitive to the last observation. The smoothing parameter 
is set to 1000. Alternative techniques yield qualitatively similar results.  
4 Little information is available on the relative share of equity and real estate wealth in household 
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for periods of up to two years. In particular, these adjustable rate mortgages make households 
vulnerable to interest rate shocks. Third, the rise in property prices occurred against the 
background of some easing in monetary policy and strong domestic credit growth. As will be 
shown in this paper, in industrial countries, this constellation of macroeconomic factors has 
been associated with an increase in the probability of a house price correction. 
 
III.   ASSET PRICE BOOMS, INFLATION, RECESSIONS, AND FINANCIAL INSTABILITY 
In general, monetary authorities may be concerned about asset price boom periods because of 
the macroeconomic repercussions. In particular, price booms may signal a rise in inflation or 
be followed by an asset price reversal that results in a slowdown in economic activity and, 
possibly, a period of financial instability.  
Increases in asset prices could signal a rise in inflation or inflation expectations. If asset price 
developments are a leading indicator for inflation, a tightening of monetary policy may be 
warranted, to avoid an increase in inflation. In the context of a new Keynesian model with 
sticky prices and a financial accelerator, Bernanke and Gertler (1999, and 2001) show in a 
number of simulations that monetary authorities should indeed consider asset price changes 
if, and only if, they signal changes in inflation expectations. However, the empirical evidence 
on the relationship between asset price booms and inflation is mixed (see also Stock and 
Watson, 2003). Borio, English, and Filardo (2003) find that, on average, inflation does not 
increase significantly during, and directly after, the boom. Borio and Lowe (2002) suggest 
that causality may also run in the opposite direction. A disinflation period or a low inflation 
environment may be conducive to the development of an asset price boom. Most of the asset 
price booms in industrial countries during the late 1990s/early 2000s occurred during a 
period of disinflation or in a low-inflation environment. Developments in South Africa also 
appear to correspond to the situation where a boom period developed during a disinflation 
period.  
Increases in asset prices are often followed by asset price corrections which, in turn, may 
lead to a slowdown in economic activity and may be accompanied by a period of financial 
instability.
5 From a policy perspective, it would be useful to identify regularities that help to 
distinguish between  boom periods that were followed by a sharp drop in real GDP (high-
cost) booms from those that were followed by a relatively mild slowdown (low-cost boom). 
Analyzing 38 aggregate asset price boom periods since 1970 for 18 OECD countries, Detken 
and Smets (2004) define a high cost boom as an aggregate asset price boom period that was 
followed by a sharp drop of GDP, defined as a drop of 3 percentage points between the boom 
period and the average of the two years following the boom.  
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Table 1 reports some key results for selected macroeconomic variables, distinguishing 
between the average developments during the pre-boom, boom and the post-boom  period for 
high-cost and low-cost booms (Detken and Smets, 2004). The pre-boom period is defined as 
the average of the two years before the asset price boom, whereas the post-boom period 
refers to the average of the two years after the boom. Real GDP growth and investment 
growth has been strong in the pre-boom period,  indicating that asset price booms are 
associated with business cycle upturns.  
In the case of high-cost booms real GDP dropped on average by 4 percentage points. High 
cost booms are associated with a significantly larger decline in property prices. Moreover, 
high-cost asset price booms are also characterized by more rapid domestic demand growth 
(consumption and investment) during the boom period as well as money and credit growth. 
Whereas average interest rates in low-cost asset price booms remain fairly constant during 
the boom period, interest rates rose during the high-cost booms. In high cost booms, private 
consumption and, more importantly, investment drop sharply in the post-boom period.  
We extend these results to analyze the probability that asset price booms are followed by a 
recession (defined as negative annual real GDP growth) or a period of weak economic 
growth (annual GDP growth <1 percent). To calculate the probability, we first identified 
boom periods for equity prices and property prices for 18 industrial countries. The 
probability is then obtained by dividing the number of asset price booms that were followed 
by a recession or a period of weak growth within two years by the number of boom periods. 
Table 2 shows that the probability is over 40 percent that an aggregate asset price boom is 
followed by a recession within two years and there is some 70 percent probability that it is 
followed by a period of weak economic growth.
6 Results confirm that recessions are more 
likely to occur after residential property price booms. Stock market booms are followed by a 
recession within the next two years only in one out of seven cases.  
Overall, the above stylized facts are consistent with a credit/collateral driven asset price 
boom and bust cycle. An easing of monetary policy during the pre-boom and boom period 
contributes to strong credit growth.  Rising asset prices increase the value of collateral, 
which, in turn, stimulate lending further. This trend reverses with a drop in asset prices.     
Developments in South Africa appear to share some of these characteristics, notably the 
loosening of monetary conditions. Monetary and credit policy has provided a stimulus to the 
market. Monetary and credit policy was eased in 2003 and interest rates were lowered by 650 
basis points between June 2003 and April 2005. Mortgage rates fell in line with official 
short-term interest rates and, as a result, the commercial banks’ variable mortgage rate fell to 
                                                 
6 Results are obtained by dividing the number of asset price booms that were followed by a recession, 
defined as negative annual real GDP growth,  or a period of weak economic growth (< 1 percent) by 
the number of boom periods.  
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10.5 percent in the second quarter of 2005 from over 23 percent at the end of 1998. But a 
number of factors relatively specific to South Africa have also supported property 
developments. Private sector analysts point to factors, such as a growing black middle class, 
an increasing scarcity of suitable and properly serviced land, an increasing demand for local 
property by South Africans living abroad, and foreign investors’ interest in coastal properties 
(Absa, 2005a,b). The magnitude of the overall effect of recent tax changes, such as reduction 
in the transfer duty for the third consecutive year
 in the 2004/05 budget, is more difficult to 
predict.   
 
Asset price changes may also lead to financial imbalances and financial instability in the 
medium term.
7 A number of banking crises in industrial countries were associated with a 
property price boom, including the crises in Japan (1992) and in the Nordic countries (e.g., 
Norway in 1987, Finland in 1991, and Sweden in 1991).  
At present, however, the banking sector in South Africa, which finances most real estate 
transactions, appears reasonably well protected against a possible drop in property prices. 
Banks are well capitalized. The mortgage debt of households has grown significantly less 
rapidly than the market value of housing; the ratio of household debt to market value of 
housing shrank to 47 percent in 2004 from 68 percent in 2000. The average risk-weighted 
capital-adequacy ratio stood at  13.3 percent at the end of December 2004. Net 
nonperforming loans (nonperforming loans less specific provisions) as a ratio of total loans 
were below 2 percent.  
Still, the distress phase at the end of a boom period may be long-lasting, while economic 
activity is holding up well. Therefore, the link between asset prices and financial stability 
may be of a longer-term nature. 
 
IV.   PRACTICAL ISSUES FOR POLICYMAKERS 
 
If policymakers were able to identify high-cost asset price booms, they would be confronted 
with two choices. Policymakers can opt for a proactive monetary policy that aims at 
preventing the emergence of an “asset price bubble” or follow a “reactive policy” of 
aggressive easing once the asset price bubble has burst. A proactive policy rests on the ability 
of the authorities to influence asset prices in the desired manner.
8  
                                                 
7 See, for example, Mishkin and White, 2002, Schwartz, 2002, and Bean 2003. 
8 See for example, Smets (1997), Cogley (1999), Bordo and Jeanne (2002), Hunter, Kaufman, and 
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It remains open to debate as to the extent the monetary authorities can influence asset price 
developments with the necessary degree of precision. Given the complex nature of the 
transmission mechanism, the increase in interest rates necessary to halt an asset price boom is 
difficult to determine. A small increase in interest rates may have no significant impact on 
stock or property prices. It may even lead to a further boost in asset prices, as small increases 
may reassure consumers and investors that the central bank is “ahead of the curve”. 
Moreover, the existence of various asset classes complicates the appropriate timing of the 
move, in particular if asset price developments are not synchronized.
9  
In addition, (small) open emerging market economies may not face the same set of policy 
options as large industrial countries, in particular the United States. Although cross-border 
trading of real estate is more difficult than cross-border trading of securities, empirical 
findings show that property price developments are linked internationally through cross-
border financial integration (IMF 2004). Global interest rate developments and global 
economic activity appear to be major determinants of house prices in industrial countries. 
The average of the pairwise correlations of annual changes in real property prices between 
the United States and the other 17 industrial countries in our sample is 0.35. Between 1994 
and 2004, the correlation between annual changes in real property prices in the United States 
and South Africa was on the order of 0.75.
10 Cross-border linkages diminish the impact of 
domestic policy changes.  
Experience from industrial countries suggests that there appears to be some reluctance from 
central bankers to admit that asset price developments play a significant role in their 
policymaking.
11 From a central banker’s perspective, the risks involved are asymmetric. In 
the case of preemptive tightening, there is a risk that the central bank will be blamed for 
bursting sound economic developments (The Economist, 2002, September 5). On the other 
hand, monetary policy may well be applauded for easing aggressively during an asset price 
bust period. However, a policy that favors an aggressive lowering of interest rates when asset 
prices tumble and (explicitly) refrains from an increase when asset prices boom, may create 
moral hazard problems. As long as private investors anticipate that the central bank will 
aggressively lower interest rates in the case of a bursting asset price boom, the central bank 
would provide some sort of safety net to international investors. Investors have incentives to 
follow a riskier investment strategy (Trichet, 2003). This asymmetry has the characteristics 
of a put option and may, therefore, give additional stimulus to an asset price boom. In their 
three period-model, Berger, Kißmer and Wagner (2005) show that a policy of “benign 
neglect” towards asset price booms is generally not optimal when private agents are forward 
looking.  
                                                 
9 In many cases stock market developments lead property price developments by 1–2 years. 
10 The correlation coefficient is negative (-0.16) for the period 1980 to 2002. 
11 See Mussa, 2003, p. 49.  -  9  - 
 
If the central bank aims at influencing asset price developments, an appropriate 
communication strategy may be critical. Unfortunately, economic theory offers few insights 
into the linkages between communication, public reaction, and economic outcomes. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that policymakers run the risk of contributing to financial 
market volatility, if they respond inappropriately to asset price developments, as for example 
has often been the case where policymakers tried to support exchange rates at levels not 
consistent with fundamentals. 
The communication strategy needs to take into account the likelihood that the link between 
asset price developments and financial stability is of a longer-term nature. A number of 
central banks in industrial countries regularly publish Financial Stability Reports. In March 
2004 the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) published its first Financial Stability Review, 
which will help monitor developments in the financial system and help identify potential 
risks. Increasing sophistication of these reports will be a useful communication tool and may 
complement existing analyses for the conduct of monetary policy. As Mussa notes 
(2003, p. 50), it is important that any change in interest rates is undertaken and explained in 
the context of overall economic developments. 
 
V.   POLICY CONCLUSIONS FOR SOUTH AFRICA 
South Africa appears to share some of the characteristics (property price boom, easing of 
monetary policy, strong domestic credit growth) of asset price boom periods in industrial 
countries. These were often followed by a period of weak growth and, in some cases, 
banking sector fragility. At the same time, however, a closer analysis of available indicators 
suggests that aggregate asset price developments are, by and large, still in line with 
fundamentals.  
The experience of industrial countries also suggests that a number of practical obstacles need 
to be overcome before a more proactive role of monetary policy is warranted. Because of the 
importance of global interest rates in explaining future movements in house prices, the role 
of monetary policy may be more limited in smaller economies. Open emerging market 
economies, therefore, may have to focus on the development of an appropriate regulatory 
environment and financial infrastructure to reduce the risk of future bubbles.  
In South Africa, one risk relates to a sudden increase in interest rates, although at this stage 
the banking sector seems to be reasonably resilient to such a shock. The lag of long-term 
financing options makes borrowers more vulnerable to shifts in interest rates. To reduce this 
vulnerability, further analyses should be undertaken to investigate what changes may be 
needed to create an environment that would be conducive to a larger set of mortgage 
contracts. A larger variety of available mortgage contracts, including longer-term fixed-rate 
contracts, should allow for a more efficient allocation of interest rate risk.  
As in many industrial countries, housing price data availability in South Africa is somewhat 
limited and relies on one private sector provider, Absa, the largest mortgage provider. A   - 10 - 
 
more systematic nationwide collection of data would provide more representative data. 
Moreover, if quality improvements are not adequately captured in housing market data, the 
measured increase in house prices may be overstated. At the same time, it would be 
important to collect comprehensive data on commercial property price developments. 
Commercial property prices also tend to follow boom bust cycles that are not necessarily 
synchronized with developments in residential property prices, but may lead to similar 
negative economic effects. Given the importance of the housing sector, improvements in the 
reliability of housing market data would be desirable.   - 11 - 
 
House and Stock Prices in Real Terms

















Sources: Absa, Datastream.  
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Average Pre-boom Average Boom Average Post-boom
High-Cost Low-Cost High-Cost Low-Cost High-Cost Low-Cost
∆ Real GDP 3.3 3.5 4.2 3.3 *** 0.1 1.6 ***
∆ Aggregate asset prices 6.3 5.1 10.4 8.0 -9.1 -5.3 ***
∆ Equity prices 12.7 8.1 11.2 13.7 -10.8 -6.6
∆ Real estate prices 0.7 3.8 9.3 6.2 *** -7.3 -1.3 ***
∆ Consumption 3.2 3.5 4.1 3.3 *** -0.2 2.3 ***
∆ Investment 6.1 7.2 7.6 6.3 -6.2 -2.2 ***
∆ Money 5.6 4.3 ** 8.5 5.0 *** 1.2 2.7 ***
∆ Domestic Credit 3.5 4.7 9.7 6.2 * -0.9 1.6 **
∆ CPI 6.2 2.9 * 6.5 3.0 5.2 4.2
Nominal interest rate 9.0 7.4 10.5 7.3 ** 12.1 9.3
Real interest rate 3.8 3.3 5.5 3.2 5.2 3.9
Source: Detken and Smets, 2004.
(Stars (***, **, *) denote significance of the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, testing for the difference 
in populations between high-cost and low-cost episodes at the 5 percent, 10 percent, and 15 percent
significance level. 
Table 1: Difference between Low- and High-cost booms  - 13 - 
 
Table 2: Probability of Asset Price Booms Followed by a Period of Slow Growth 
Recession 1/ Weak Economic 
Growth 2/
Aggregate Asset Price Boom 42 71
Stock Markt Boom 14 39
Residential Property Price Boom 47 70
Source: Authors' calculations.
1/ A recession is defined as a period of negative real GDP growth. 
2/  Periods of weak economic growth are associated with annual real GDP 
     growth below one percent.
(In percent)
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